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Abstract 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) at the Dryden Flight Research Center 
(DFRC) has been conducting flight-test research using an F-15 aircraft (figure 1).  This aircraft has been 
specially modified to interface a neural net (NN) controller as part of a single-string Airborne Research Test 
System (ARTS) computer with the existing quad-redundant flight control system (FCC) shown in figure 2. 
The NN commands are passed to FCC channels 2 and 4 and are cross channel data linked (CCDL) to the 
other computers as shown.  Numerous types of fault-detection monitors exist in the FCC when the NN mode 
is engaged; these monitors would cause an automatic disengagement of the NN in the event of a triggering 
fault.  Unfortunately, these monitors still may not prevent a possible NN hard-over command from coming 
through to the control laws.  Therefore, an additional and unique safety monitor was designed for a single-
string source that allows authority at maximum actuator rates but protects the pilot and structural loads against 
excessive g-limits in the case of a NN hard-over command input.  This additional monitor resides in the FCCs 
and is executed before the control laws are computed. 
 
This presentation describes a “floating limiter” (FL) concept1 that was developed and successfully 
test-flown for this program (figure 3).  The FL computes the rate of change of the NN commands that are 
input to the FCC from the ARTS.  A window is created with upper and lower boundaries, which is constantly 
“floating” and trying to stay centered as the NN command rates are changing.  The limiter works by only 
allowing the window to move at a much slower rate than those of the NN commands.  Anywhere within the 
window, however, full rates are allowed.  If a rate persists in one direction, it will eventually “hit” the 
boundary and be rate-limited to the floating limiter rate.  When this happens, a persistent counter begins and 
after a limit is reached, a NN disengage command is generated.  The tunable metrics for the FL are (1) 
window size, (2) drift rate, and (3) persistence counter.  Ultimate range limits are also included in case the NN 
command should drift slowly to a limit value that would cause the FL to be defeated. 
 
The FL has proven to work as intended.  Both high-g transients and excessive structural loads are 
controlled with NN hard-over commands.  This presentation discusses the FL design features and presents test 
cases.  Simulation runs are included to illustrate the dramatic improvement made to the control of NN hard-
over effects.  A mission control room display from a flight playback is presented to illustrate the neural net 
fault display representation.  The FL is very adaptable to various requirements and is independent of flight 
condition.  It should be considered as a cost-effective safety monitor to control single-string inputs in general. 
 
 
1 “Design of Safety Monitor Schemes for a Fault Tolerant Flight Control System,” IEEE Transactions on 
Aerospace and Electronic Systems Vol. 42, No. 2, April 2006. 
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Figure 1 – F15 Intelligent Flight Control System Test Bed Aircraft 
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Figure 2 – Neural Net Controller Architecture with Flight Control Computers 
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Figure 3 – Floating Limiter Features  
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Overview
• Requirements
• Neural net interfaces 
• Design approach
• Review of existing safety monitors
• New safety monitor developed
• Testing
• A surprise
• Flight data display playback
• Summary
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Requirements
• Interface neural net controller with F15 enhanced 
control laws for flight test experiment
– Flight conditions: 0.75M/20Kft, and 0.90M/25Kft
– Maximum transients: + 2g vertical, + 0.5g lateral
– Maneuvers: Straight & level, 3g wind-up-turn (WUT), simulated 
stabilator/canard failures, loads maneuvers; all maneuvers 
include pitch/roll/yaw (pqr) doublets
• Ground Rules/Constraints
– Protect from exceeding any aircraft structural load limits
– Avoid departure from controlled flight
– Neural net commands shall support full control surface 
authority at maximum actuator rates
– Minimize nuisance disengagements 
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Neural Net Interfaces
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Design Approach
• Specific Aircraft faults which occur while in neural net 
mode will cause a downmode to conventional mode with a 
1 sec fader conventional
claws
enhanced
claws
nn
claws
failure 
disengagement
• Safety monitors are executed in SCE3 at 80hz
• Disengagement triggers are instrumented and latched 
for analysis
• All validation testing is done using hardware in the loop 
closed loop simulation
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Overview of Existing Safety 
Monitors
• Flight Computer Faults
– Single failure of any dual channel signal
– Dual failure of any quad channel signal
– FC Configuration fault (Config fail)
– Channel fail
– BLIN (Bit Level Inspect) code
– PAL (Pick-a-Limit) Violation
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FC PAL limits
Envelope #1 Envelope #2
Lower Limit Upper Limit Lower Limit Upper Limit
Angle of Attack -4.0 deg 12.0 deg -4.0 deg 12.0 deg
Sideslip Angle -5.0 deg 5.0 deg -5.0 deg 5.0 deg
Pitch Angle -180 deg 180 deg -180 deg 180 deg
Bank Angle -90 deg 90 deg -180 deg 180 deg
Pitch Rate -45 deg/sec 45 deg/sec -60 deg/sec 60 deg/sec
Roll Rate -75 deg/sec 75 deg/sec -300 deg/sec 300 deg/sec
Yaw Rate -15 deg/sec 15 deg/sec -60 deg/sec 60 deg/sec
Normal Acceleration 0.0 g 3.0 g -1.0 g 6.0 g
Lateral Acceleration -0.5 g 0.5 g -1.0 g 1.0 g
Mach 0.55 0.95 0.55 0.95
Qbar 253 psf 733 psf 253 psf 733 psf
Altitude 15000 ft 35000 ft 15000 ft 35000 ft
Pitch Stick -3.1 in 5.46 in -3.1 in 5.46 in
Roll Stick -4.0 in 4.0 in -4.0 in 4.0 in
Yaw Pedal -3.25 in 3.25 in -3.25 in 3.25 in
Throttle (PLA) 16.5 deg 130 deg 16.5 deg 130 deg
Parameter
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FC Configuration Faults
1. Lt Throttle Within PAL Limits
2. Rt Throttle Within PAL Limits
3. Flaps in Correct PAL Mode
4. Landing Gear in Correct PAL Mode
5. Throttle Switch in Correct PAL Mode
6. Spin Switch in Correct PAL Mode
7. Weight-On-Wheels in Correct PAL Mode
8. Qbar Limit Exceeded
9. Aircraft Not At Trim (pitch/bank monitor)
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ARTS II Fault Monitors
• Built in Test Failures
– failure detected through Periodic Bit (PBIT)
– failure detected through Power Up Bit (PUBIT)
• Multibit ECC (error code correction) Memory Errors (ARTS-
II will log the event and transition to FAILED)
• 1553 Communications Failure
– 1553 Wrap Word Failure
• ARTS Neural Net (Sigma Pi) Failures 
– failure to initialize data recording
– failure to register experiment with Executive
– failure to receive data from SBC 1 (VXMP failure)
– failure to send data to SBC 1 (VXMP failure)
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ARTS II Fault Monitors
(Continued)
• Executive Failures:
– failure to detect correct checksum
– failure to receive data from Sigma Pi on SBC 2 (VXMP failure)
– failure to send data to SBC 2 (VXMP failure)
– The system monitor (SYSMON) task detects a problem with 
any other task such as failure to initialize or abnormal 
termination
– SBC board boot failure
• Analog Failures:
– analog card fails to load driver
– analog card fails to calibrate
• Any disk I/O errors
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Structural Safety Monitoring
• Added strain gages to aircraft for loads measurements
• Converted existing loads model from FORTRAN to ADA, 
but memory size too large and execution time too long to fit 
in 80hz frame cycle in SCE3
• Existing loads model was not validated
• No confidence that existing fault monitors would prevent a 
Neural Net hardover from exceeding aircraft G and 
structural load limits
• Conclusion was a new safety monitor was needed
– A Floating Limiter Design was developed
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Floating Limiter Design 
• Apply floating limiter windows for the sigma pi (neural net) 
commands (P,Q,R) 
• Maximum rate of change is allowed within the window
• Limit the rate of change while on the floating limiter 
boundary
• Allow full authority up to the range limiter
• Provide flags to sigma pi to stop learning
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Simulation Testing 
• Flight conditions (2 design points) 
– .75M/20Kft
– .90M/25Kft (worst case)
• Maneuvers
– Straight & level with pqr doublets
– 3g WUT with pqr doublets 
– Simulated failures
• Straight & level with pqr doublets
• 3g WUT with pqr doublets
– Loads maneuvers 
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Software Testing Maneuvers
Bank angle captures (60 deg)
P doublets
Q doublets
R doubles
Stab fails; 0 from trim
Stab fails; +2 from trim
Stab fails; -2 from trim
Stab fails; +4 from trim
Stab fails; -4 from trim
Stab fails; +4 from trim with p doublet
Stab fails; +4 from trim with q doublet
Stab fails; +4 from trim with r doublet
Sigma Pi hardover from trim; +p no fail 
Sigma Pi hardover from trim; -p no fail 
Sigma Pi hardover from trim; +q no fail 
Sigma Pi hardover from trim; -q no fail 
Sigma Pi hardover from trim; +r no fail 
Sigma Pi hardover from trim; -r no fail
Sigma Pi hardover from trim; +p, 4 deg fail 
Sigma Pi hardover from trim; -p, 4 deg fail 
Sigma Pi hardover from trim; +q, 4 deg fail 
Sigma Pi hardover from trim; -q, 4 deg fail 
Sigma Pi hardover from trim; +r, 4 deg fail 
Sigma Pi hardover from trim; -r, 4 deg fail
Sigma Pi hardover from 3g WUT; +p, 4 deg fail 
Sigma Pi hardover from 3g WUT; -p, 4 deg fail 
Sigma Pi hardover from 3g WUT; +q, 4 deg fail 
Sigma Pi hardover from 3g WUT; -q, 4 deg fail 
Sigma Pi hardover from 3g WUT; +r, 4 deg fail 
Sigma Pi hardover from 3g WUT; -r, 4 deg fail 
Roll doublet in 3g WUT
Pitch doublet in 3g WUT
Yaw doublet in 3g WUT
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Rt Stab Failure from Trim
fl_drift_table_conf_file
P 
axis
Q 
axis
R 
axis
0 deg, dps3
Transition
Final
150
500
50
90
0.03
0.01
+2 deg, dps3
Transition
Final
230
700
60
60
0.03
0.02
+4 deg, dps3
Transition
Final
430
850
60
60
0.03
0.02
-2 deg, dps3
Transition
Final
230
525
60
60
0.03
0.09
-4 deg, dps3
Transition
Final
430
550
60
60
0.03
0.09
Canard
AOA fails
P 
axis
Q 
axis
R 
axis
Set 1; dps3
Transition
Final
100
100
1
1
0.03
0.03
Set 2; dps3
Transition
Final
100
100
20
20
0.03
0.03
Metrics
Initial drift, dps3 1.0 1.0 0.01
Delta, dps2 200 52 0.10
Range limit, dps2 1000 500 0.10
Persistence time, sec 0.75 1.25 0.75
Transition time, sec 3
Floating Limiter Constants
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Parameter Description Units Bus RT SA W Bit
fl_dmode_flag (0), p fl_plim_flag(0) or 
fl_hrange_flag(0)
bit FC 15 2 25 00
fl_dmode_flag (1), q fl_plim_flag(1) or 
fl_hrange_flag(1)
bit FC 15 2 25 01
fl_dmode_flag (2), r fl_plim_flag(2) or 
fl_hrange_flag(2)
bit FC 15 2 25 02
fl_drift_flag (0), p NN cmd (p) is limited bit FC 15 2 25 03
fl_drift_flag (1), q NN cmd (q) is limited bit FC 15 2 25 04
fl_drift_flag (2), r NN cmd (r) is limited bit FC 15 2 25 05
fl_plim_flag (0) p persistence ctr (p) is max –
downmode
bit FC 15 3 2 10
fl_plim_flag (1) q persistence ctr (q) is max –
downmode
bit FC 15 3 2 11
fl_plim_flag (2) r persistence ctr (r) is max –
downmode
bit FC 15 3 2 12
fl_hrange_flag (0), p NN cmd (p) is at hard range 
limit - downmode
bit FC 15 3 2 13
fl_hrange_flag (1), q NN cmd (q) is at hard range 
limit - downmode
bit FC 15 3 2 14
fl_hrange_flag (2), r NN cmd (r) is at hard range 
limit - downmode
bit FC 15 3 2 15
Floating Limiter Outputs
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Floating limiter
Drift boundary hit
Enhanced 
disengagement
Nz PAL limit hit,
Enhanced 
disengagement
Time,sec
Sigma Pi Pitch Hardover
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Floating limiter
Drift boundary hit
Enhanced 
disengagement
No enhanced 
disengagement
(entire run)
Time,sec
Sigma Pi Roll Hardover
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Sigma Pi Roll Hardover:
no floating limiter
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Sigma Pi Roll Hardover:
with floating limiter
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Ny PAL limit hit,
Enhanced 
disengagement
Floating limiter
Drift boundary hit
Enhanced 
disengagement
Time,sec
Sigma Pi Yaw Hardover
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-1 Nz PAL limit 
Enhanced
disengage
Floating limiter
disengage
Sigma Pi hardover
(1000 dpss)
4 deg stab 
fail
Time,sec
Sigma Pi Pitch Hardover
4 deg stab fail
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4 deg stab 
fail
-4 AOA PAL limit,
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Sigma Pi hardover
(1500 dpss)
Floating limiter
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Time,sec
Sigma Pi Roll Hardover
4 deg stab fail
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Sigma Pi hardover
10 deg/sec2
Ny PAL limit hit,
Enhanced 
disengagement
Floating limiter
Disengage
Persistence time out
Time,sec
Sigma Pi Yaw Hardover
4 deg stab fail
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Time,sec
Sigma Pi - moderate doublets
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Surprise
An Unexpected Test Anomaly
• Discrepancy excerpt:
“During dry runs of the supplemental HILS tests on ifcs_051g to simulate 
ARTSII failure modes, a   four channel left stabilator shutdown was 
experienced as a result of dropping the ARTS_OK_to_Couple Flag in 
channel 2 with Neural Nets Enabled, and a simulated Stab failure.
The test scenario was duplicated five times, one case all four channels of 
the left stabilator turned off. In all other cases, either just ch 1 and 2 or 
just ch3 and 4 stabilator failed (2 channel vs four channel fail).  The test 
was run at M.75 @20K with PAL=8 and DAG=21 (4 deg left stab bias).”
BLIN code F143 = left stabilator current disconnect 
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An Unexpected Test Anomaly
• Analysis
An FCC fault in channel 2 was created which resulted in that channel 
initiating the downmode logic from neural net to the conventional control 
laws.  This downmode logic did not occur during the same minor frames 
in the FCC, resulting in different commands to the 4 channel actuator 
electronics.  Consequently, a force fight was created which triggered the 
stab current monitor.
• Corrective Action
Add downmode information to the FCC cross channel data link so that all 
the FCC channels transition in the same frame thereby eliminating the 
force fight condition 
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Mission Control Data Display
- from flight playback
• IADS display playback showing floating limiter from the 
neural net pitch command being set
• 3g WUT maneuver with 2 deg left stab lock fail set
• Neural net engaged
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Floating Limiter Summary
• Meets disengage transients criteria for NN hardover
(accelerations and loads)
– Worst case 4 deg stab failure
– Worst case canard failure
– Worst case flight condition
– Aggressive maneuvering flight
• Piloted simulation shows disengagements are acceptable, 
also validated from flight test
• No nuisance disengagements
• Concept may be applied to any single string controller, not 
only neural net commands
